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NOTES
The Recovery of Future Damages in a Continuing
Antitrust Conspiracy: From Lawlor to Zenith and Beyond
I. Introduction
Section 4 of the Clayton Act' authorizes private persons to bring suit to
enforce the antitrust laws of the United States. This power was granted with
the congressional intent that private suits serve "as a bulwark of antitrust en-
forcement" 2 and that the antitrust laws fully "protect the victims of the forbid-
den practices as well as the public." 3 The Clayton Act provides these victims
with not only the recovery of all damages incurred, but also the trebling of
those damages.
Courts were initially hesitant to permit the recovery of treble damages in
private antitrust suits unless positive proof of damages could be shown. Given
the nature of antitrust damages this was often a difficult burden for the plain-
tiffs. Courts today, though, no longer require this high degree of certainty
when proving damages, often permitting proof of loss which approaches
speculation. 4 The determination of recoverable damages, however, remains
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Prior to 1955, § 7 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), also supplied private relief. However, § 7 was
repealed under Pub. L. No. 84-137, 5 3, 69 Stat. 282 (1955). Thereafter, § 4 of the Clayton Act became the
sole basis for such private actions.
2 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
3 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
4 The history of antitrust damages manifests an increasing flexibility in permitting greater degrees of
estimation as the basis for damages determinations. Judicial conservatism during the period up to 1939 re-
quired a precise showing of damages by the claimant. In particular, this attitude, stemming from English
common law, viewed any estimate of lost profit as too uncertain and speculative to form the basis of an
award, regardless of whether it was past, present, or future profit that was in question. Guilfoil, Damage
Determination in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 647 (1967). An example of this attitude is the
reticence shown by the court in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (8th Cir. 1901), in which
the plaintiff wished to recover a measure of the expected profits of his business of buying and selling coal,
profits that he would have made without the alleged price-fixing actions of the defendants. In keeping with
accepted judicial doctrine of the time, the court stated that "[a]ctual damages only may be secured. Those
that are speculative, remote, uncertain, may not form the basis of a lawful judgment." Id. at 98. Based on
this principle the court ruled that "the anticipated profits of a business are generally so dependent upon
numerous and uncertain contingencies that their amount is not susceptible of proof with any reasonable
degree of certainty." Id. at 98.
This initial refusal by the courts gave way to an increasing acceptance of previously inadmissible
evidence. The Supreme Court led the way in changing this attitude. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), the Supreme Court pointed out that the amount of the damage
was not the element in need of certain proof, but rather, the fact that injury had occurred. Once it could be
determined that the wrong had been committed, those damages which were attributable to that wrong could
be recovered based on mere approximations. In a later case the Supreme Court upheld a court of appeals'
statement that "[d]amages are not rendered uncertain because they cannot be calculated with absolute ex-
actness." Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). It was considered sufficient if a
reasonable basis of computation was afforded, even though the result would be approximate.
Today, it is accepted practice that recovery of antitrust damages is not limited to those situations where
the plaintiff can prove his damages with reasonable certainty. "[T]he trier of fact may make a just and
reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data and may act upon probable and inferential as well
as direct and positive proof." Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorainjournal Co., 358 F.2d 790 (6th Cir.
1966). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). As stated above, the "older standards
requiring 'certainty' of damages have given way to proof of losses which border on the speculative, in order
to implement the policy of the antitrust laws." Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874,
887 (Ist Cir. 1966).
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difficult when the basis of the antitrust suit is not reducible to an act which oc-
curred at a defined time and place. This is especially true when the activity and
its effects extend beyond the time of trial. When the injury is of a continuing
nature, courts have been faced with the complicated problem of determining
which violations the plaintiff may complain of in a single proceeding and what
damages the plaintiff will be permitted to recover.
The Supreme Court dealt with this problem in two significant cases. The
question of which violations may be the subject of a single suit was answered
early in this century in Lawlor v. Loewe. 5 The second and more complicated part
of the problem, the recovery of future damages, was the basis of the Court's
opinion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 6 The circuit courts have
not been able to agree, however, on how to interpret and apply these decisions.
This conflict is apparently the result of the refusal of the courts objectively to
interpret and apply these decisions. This note will examine this conflict and
will show how this division between the courts could easily be rectified. The
goal in bridging this division is to permit plaintiffs to recover fully those future
damages to which the Supreme Court has said they are entitled.
II. The Continuing Conspiracy: Which Violations and What Damages?
In Lawlor, the Supreme Court established that damages in a continuing
antitrust conspiracy may be recovered only if they are the "proximate and
natural result" of the acts set out in the complaint. Such damages may occur
after the filing of the complaint and still be recoverable if they are the result of a
violation taking place before the filing of the complaint. According to the
Court, however, there may not be a recovery of damages which are or will be
the result of continuing violations which have occurred since the time the com-
plaint was filed or which will occur after the time of trial.
The plaintiffs in Lawlor were hat manufacturers who employed nonunion
labor. Defendants, members of the United Hatters of North America, had per-
suaded the American Federation of Labor to declare a boycott of plaintiffs'
goods in an effort to force plaintiffs to accept unionization. This boycott effec-
tively restrained the conduct of plaintiffs' interstate trade. The defendants were
accused of a series of overt acts, continuing over a protracted period of time.
The Supreme Court considered this series of violations to be a "continuing
conspiracy." Based on these facts the Court created the "Lawlor rule."
As a result of the decision in Lawlor, subsequent private antitrust plaintiffs
attempted to prove that the damage to their businesses was the consequence of
one act of a permanent nature and not that of a continuing conspiracy. By prov-
ing that all damages were the result of a single violation, the plaintiffs could
avoid the limitation in Lawlor and thereby recover in one proceeding all
damages proximately resulting from the alleged act. In Fontana Aviation Inc. v.
Beech Aircraft Corporation, 7 the court accepted this argument, holding that where
the plaintiffs alleged damages resulted from his inability to compete due to
5 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
6 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
7 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1970).
[October 19791
defendant's termination of plaintiff's dealership, the plaintiff could recover for
all damages as if they were the result of the single act of termination and not the
continuing refusal to deal. This situation was often presented in failure to deal
situations like Fontana, in which it was contended that the initial refusal gave
rise to the plaintiffs injury and not the day-to-day continuance of defendant's
refusal to do business with the plaintiff.
8
The majority of courts have not accepted these attempts to characterize
the initial conspiratorial action as being an action of a permanent nature. 9
When the violation creates an ongoing state, the courts have held the antitrust
violation to be a continuing conspiracy on the theory that a conspiracy is
renewed each day of its continuance.10 Each renewal is seen as a new invasion
of the plaintiff's rights, thereby giving rise to a new cause of action. Conse-
quently, instead of recovering for the conspiracy as one entire act, the court
permits recovery for only those damages resulting from acts which occur prior
to the day of filing.
In Flintkote Company v. Lysford, 1 the plaintiffs made virtually the same
argument that had been made in Fontana. The plaintiff contended that the
defendant's initial act of terminating plaintiff's source of supply for acoustical
tiles was the only overt act of the alleged conspiracy. Hence, the plaintiff
argued that this was an act of a permanent nature. Subsequent damages were,
in plaintiff's opinion, to be considered as flowing from this initial act. Con-
tinued refusal to deal after this initial act was the result of the initial manifesta-
tion of the conspiracy, and not a separate violation in and of itself.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's interpretation of the facts was "in-
correct" for
[i]n the very nature of things [the act of termination] lacked all finality. It
could mean no more than that Flintkote, on that day, was absolutely and
unalterably opposed to future dealings with the plaintiffs. [The] [a]ppellees
confuse[d] unequivocality with permanency. Flintkote's position was neither
irrevocable nor immutable. It was under no legal duty to adhere to that posi-
tion. On the contrary, it was at all times completely free to reconsider and
modify its view.
12
Thus, following the "Lawlor rule," recovery could be had only for those
damages which were proven to be the result of the individual violations occur-
ring prior to the filing of the complaint.
The normal procedure for the plaintiff to recover damages resulting from
acts of the continuing conspiracy which take place after filing of the complaint
is for the plaintiff to file a separate suit.1 3 This effect of the "Lawlor rule,"
8 See, e.g., A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex, 314 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1963) (withdrawal of a product line).
9 See, e.g., Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distillers, 101 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1939).
10 See, e.g., Washington State Bowling Prop. Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835 (1967).
12 Id. at 395.
13 Ironically, the result of increased litigation was the opposite of that foreseen by the Court in Lawlor.
The goal espoused by the court in Lawlor, which decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, was to
achieve economies in judicial administration of the antitrust laws, hoping to be able to dispose of the con-
troversy in a single action. Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721, 728 (2d Cir. 1913). This result could have been
achieved had the lower courts not insisted on concluding that a continuing conspiracy existed whenever an
ongoing state was created regardless of whether it was the result of one, initial conspiratorial act, or a series
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however, can be partially avoided. Under the present rules of civil procedure,
the original complaint may be amended by making a supplemental pleading at
trial.1 4 Supplemental pleadings obviate the need for separate suits for violations
occurring between the filing and the trial. Recovery for violations occurring
subsequent to trial, however, may be had only by bringing new actions as the
violations occur.
The Lawlor decision firmly established that an action could be brought for
violations in a continuing conspiracy when the violations had occurred prior to
the filing of the complaint. Also, all damages, either past or future, flowing
from these violations could be recovered. Likewise, Lawlor closed the door to
the possibility of recovering for any violations occurring subsequent to filing.
Procedural rules now extend this to the time of trial. Later cases filled in the
details for determining when an action was part of a continuing conspiracy,
and therefore when Lawlor would apply. Neither Lawlor nor subsequent con-
tinuing conspiracy cases establish, however, at what time the plaintiffs cause
of action would accrue, nor did they determine what would be the limits on the
recovery of future damages. These issues were to be answered in Zenith.
III. Interaction of the "Lawlor Rule" with the Statute of
Limitations-The "Zenith Exception"
A. Section 4(b) of the Clayton Act
On July 7, 1955, the President signed into law an amendment to the
Clayton Act, section 4(b), which now provides for a four-year statute of limita-
tions for private antitrust treble damage suits brought under sections 4, 4(a), or
4 (c) of the Act. 5 Although enacted to give uniformity to the statute of limita-
tions in private antitrust suits, 6 this statutory limitation created a greater
uncertainty than that which had previously existed with respect to continuing
conspiracies. In an attempt to resolve the existing confusion, the Supreme
Court gave a definitive interpretation of this statute and its application in con-
tinuing conspiracies in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 11 Subsequent
lower court decisions indicate, however, that the Court's interpretation has
been frequently misunderstood. Furthermore, even if the Court's decision in
Zenith were correctly and uniformly applied, some fundamental policy
problems would remain.
of overt acts. Had they constrained themselves to deciding that a continuing conspiracy existed only in the
latter situation, where there was a series of overt acts (as was the case in Lawlor), the result would have been
much like that reached in Fontana, i.e., recovery would be permitted for all subsequent damages where it was
shown that one overt act gave rise to them. This would permit the conclusion of the case in one action, giv-
ing effect to the goal ofjudicial economy. By adopting the theory that the one overt act could create an on-
going state, however, with a new violation occurring by the simple continuance of that state, the courts
forced plaintiffs to bring numerous suits.
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
15 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) provides in part: "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections
15, 15a, or 15c [4, 4(a), or 4(c) of the Clayton Act] of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced
within four years after the cause of action accrued."
16 Wheeler &Jones, The Statute of LimitationsforAntitrust Damages Actions: Four Years or Forty?, 41 U. OHI.
L. REv. 72, 83 (1973). In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), the
Supreme Court stated that the state statute of limitations would be applicable to private antitrust suits.
17 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
[October 1979]
B. Pre-Zenith
The major difficulty the courts face in applying section 4(b) is in determin-
ing when the plaintiffs cause of action accrues. This determination is especial-
ly difficult in a continuing conspiracy where the violations and damages may
last for several years. Before Zenith, courts had followed two distinct theories on
when the cause of action would accrue. The first theory concluded that only the
date of violation would be determinative, while the second held that the plain-
tiffs cause of action would not accrue until the date of damage.
The court in Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corporation18 stated that the date
of violation would be the determinative point. The court pointed out that
although the cause of action in a civil antitrust action would normally arise
when the damage is sustained, this would not apply in a continuing conspiracy
when, even without further overt acts, damages will continue to run over an
extended period of time. The court held that "the statute of limitations runs
. . .from the time the blow which caused the damage was struck." 19 Since
there are a series of violations in a continuing conspiracy, there will be a new
cause of action with each successive "blow." According to the court, the
amount of subsequent damage will not affect when the statute of limitations
begins to run, but rather the amount to be claimed. To rule otherwise in a con-
tinuing conspiracy would, in the eyes of the court, never permit "the cause of
action of an injured party to fully develop, nor would there be any limitation
upon the right of action, and the beneficent purpose of the statute to delimit the
right to sue would be defeated.' '20
By using the "date of violation" theory, the court in Steiner attempted to
find a balance between the advantage derived from allowing the private plain-
tiff a chance to recoup losses due to antitrust violations and the disadvantages
of allowing such suits to linger indefinitely. Rather than finding a balance,
however, the court's decision tipped the scales in favor of the defendants.
Requiring a plaintiff to bring this action within the statutory limitation
following the "blows" of the continuing conspiracy effectively limited the
damages which could be recovered. Normally only those damages which are
not speculative at the time the action is brought may be recovered. The latest
date an action may be brought, under the "date of violation" theory, will be
the statutory number of years following the violation. If at this time there are
any damages which the court considers speculative, these damages will not be
recoverable. Because of this potentially detrimental effect on antitrust plain-
tiffs, later courts have refused to accept Steiner as controlling in the continuing
conspiracy context.
Citing the immense complexities in applying the Steiner decision, the court
in Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corporation2' refused to adopt the "date of viola-
tion" rationale. Rather than analogize the plaintiffs cause of action to an or-
dinary tort action, the court likened it to actions arising out of a "continuing,
18 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
19 Id. at 194.
20 Id. at 195.
21 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958).
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but abatable nuisance, where the incidence of continuing damage may depend
on speculative factors." 22 In such situations the cause of action comes into ex-
istence as of the date of actual damage rather than accruing at the time of viola-
tion. The court reasoned that this should likewise be the applicable standard in
continuing conspiracy actions since the future damages which the plaintiff
wishes to recover are often of a speculative nature. As the court stated, it is
possible that "[t]he conspiracy may cease, or a change in the business climate
may render its efforts harmless to the plaintiff, or the plaintiff may voluntarily
abandon his enterprise.' '23
This "date of damage" approach helps the plaintiffs cause, since instead
of denying the plaintiff his cause of action where the damages are speculative,
as would be the case under Steiner, the cause of action is preserved, thus accru-
ing only when the damages have become actual and apparent. Although the
cause of action may be delayed, it will not be entirely lost. By following the
"date of damage" rationale, however, any desirable effect to be gained in hav-
ing a statute of limitations would be defeated.
Under the "date of damage" theory, the plaintiff would have a new cause
of action, and therefore, a new statutory period within which he could bring
suit, with each successive occurrence of damage. This would hold true
regardless of whether the damage comes four years or forty years after that
violation. Thus, "the beneficent purpose of the statute to delimit the right to
sue,'" 24 spoken of in Steiner, would be completely undermined.
The effect of the "date of damage" theory was made evident in Hanover v.
United Shoe Machine Corp. 25 In Hanover the Supreme Court rejected the view that
the cause of action arose at the earliest violation, and embraced the "date of
damage" theory set out in Streiffer. The plaintiff in Hanover alleged that the
defendant had obtained a monopoly of the shoe machinery market by offering
its machines only for lease and not for sale. The earliest impact of injury on the
plaintiff as a result of this leasing arrangement was alleged by the defendant to
be in 1912, when the scheme was first implemented. The defendant alleged
that the plaintiffs cause of action had therefore accrued in 1912 and was thus
barred by the then-applicable statute of limitations. In 1955, the year the suit
was brought, the Court rejected the defendant's contention, stating that in this
case they were not "dealing with a violation which, if it occurs at all, must oc-
cur within some specific and limited time span." 26 Instead, the Court found
that they were dealing with conduct which constituted a continuing violation of
the antitrust laws and which inflicted continuing and accumulating harm on
Hanover. Although Hanover could have sued in 1912 for the injury that was
being inflicted in 1912, the Court held that it was equally entitled to sue in 1955
for any damages which were continuing to occur in 1955.27 Thus, according to
the Court's decision in Hanover, the continuing conspiracy plaintiff may obtain
22 Id. at 606.
23 Id.
24 232 F.2d at 195.
25 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
26 Id. at 502 n.15.
27 Id.
[October 1979]
recovery for damages, regardless of when they occur, even if it is forty-three
years after the initial violation.
C. The "Zenith Exception"
The blessing given to the "date of damage" theory in Hanover was short-
lived. In 1971, when faced with the question of how to apply section 4(b) in a
continuing conspiracy, the Court attempted to take the best from both the
earlier theories, and thereby render justice to both potential plaintiffs and
defendants.
This hybrid, known as the "Zenith exception," was created pursuant to
litigation in which Hazeltine Research Inc. (HRI) brought suit against Zenith
Radio Corp. (Zenith) for patent infringement. 28 In 1963 Zenith counter-
claimed, alleging that HRI had violated the antitrust laws by its participation
in patent pools in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. Zenith claimed that
by the existence of these patent pools, it had been systematically excluded from
selling in the three countries. The trial judge found in favor of Zenith,
awarding it damages in the amount of $16,238,872 before trebling.
HRI moved to amend its reply to Zenith's counterclaim and to reopen the
record for the taking of additional evidence. In its motion HRI argued that
Zenith's counterclaim was barred by section 4(b) of the Clayton Act. HRI con-
tended that those damages awarded to Zenith for the period 1959-1963 were
caused by conduct occurring prior to 1959. Since Zenith's counterclaim was
brought more than four years after that conduct, HRI maintained that the
statute of limitations barred recovery. The trial judge permitted the filing of the
limitations defense and subsequently reduced the damage award with respect
to the Australian and English markets as a result of it. He refused, however, to
reduce the damage award for the injuries to Zenith in the Canadian market.
29
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision on the ground that
Zenith had failed to prove injury to its business in any of the three markets,
thereby denying Zenith's recovery completely.3 0 The Supreme Court, in its
first review of this case, affirmed the court of appeals' decision denying
recovery for the injury allegedly incurred by Zenith in the English and
Australian markets, but it reversed as to the Canadian market, stating that
Zenith had proved damage to its business in that market. 31 The Court noted
that some of the damages awarded Zenith were the result of pre-1959 con-
spiratorial conduct, but based on the belief that the trial judge had either re-
jected the statute of limitations defense on the merits or had deemed it waived,
it said nothing further on the subject.
3 2
On remand to determine damages, the court of appeals found that the
trial court had neither deemed the statute of limitations to have been waived by
28 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ili. 1965), modified, 388 F.2d
25 (7th Cir. 1967), aff'd in part, 395 U.S. 100 (1969), on remand 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 397
U.S. 979 (1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
29 239 F. Supp. 51.
30 388 F.2d 25.
31 395 U.S. 100.
32 Id. at 117 n.13.
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HRI, nor had it rejected this defense on the merits. The court therefore sent
the case back to the trial court to determine to what extent, if any, the original
damages awarded by the trial court should be reduced given the acceptance of
the limitations defense.3 3 The Supreme Court once again granted certiorari.
34
Zenith had originally contended that the conspiracy by HRI and other co-
conspirators had lasted for several years prior to the filing of the counterclaim
in 1963. In its counterclaim Zenith had stated that even though this was true, it
wished to obtain damages only for what it termed the "four-year statutory
damage period," 1959 through 1963. Zenith claimed that as a result of the con-
spiracy, it had lost profits in the Canadian market afterJanuary 1, 1959, total-
ling $6,300,000. Even though it was certain that some of these damages were
the result of pre-1959 conspiratorial conduct, Zenith claimed recovery for all
damages suffered during this period. In its motion for relitigation, HRI con-
tended that the portion of the damages which was the result of pre-1959 con-
spiratorial conduct was barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, HRI
argued that because it had committed no damaging overt acts during the
1959-1963 period in furtherance of the conspiracy, all of the alleged damage
claims would be barred.
5
Reversing the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court rejected
HRI's contention that recovery under section 4(b) may be had only for those
damages resulting from overt acts committed during the four-year statutory
period prior to the filing of the action.3 6 The Court highlighted the present-day
importance of the "Lawlor rule" in its decision, explaining that it was an ac-
cepted principle that with each passing day of a continuing conspiracy a new
violation occurs and, therefore, a new cause of action accrues. The Court also
noted that it was generally accepted that the plaintiff in a continuing conspiracy
may recover all damages resulting from pretrial violations in a single pro-
ceeding, regardless of whether the damages are suffered prior to or subsequent
to the time of trial.
Regarding the application of the statute of limitations, the Court stated
that normally a plaintiffs cause of action will accrue on the date of violation.
The Court saw itself faced with- a dilemma, however, if it were to apply the
"date of violation" theory when the violations were the result of a continuing
conspiracy. The Court's difficulty in attempting to apply the "date of viola-
tion" standard to a continuing conspiracy was the same in attempting to apply
the same type of standard set out in the Steiner decision. By forcing plaintiffs to
bring their private antitrust suits within four years of violation, the plaintiffs
would be effectively barred from recovering those future damages which are
speculative at the time the action is brought. At first, this result would appear
justified. Although the courts are extremely lenient in determining what is
33 418 F.2d 21.
34 397 U.S. 979.
35 401 U.S. at 326-29.
36 Although not determinative on the question of Zenith's ability to sue for recovery of damages suf-
fered during the limitations period from pre-limitations conduct, it should be noted that the Court also held
that by reason of Government antitrust actions brought against several of HRI's co-conspirators, the statute
of limitations was tolled from November 24, 1958, to November 1, 1963, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. S 16(b)
(1976). Thus, the Court held that the question before it was whether Zenith could recover in its 1963 suit for
damages suffered after January 1, 1959, as the consequences of conspiratorial conduct prior to 1954-four
years prior to the date the statute was tolled.
[October 1979]
speculative, there must remain a point when the courts conclude that future
damages are too speculative to permit recovery. When considered from the
standpoint of a plaintiff, however, the result appears inequitable.
The plaintiff in a continuing conspiracy is permitted to recover for suc-
cessive violations, namely, the day-to-day renewal of the continuing con-
spiracy, up to the date of trial. Under the "date of violation" approach, the
plaintiffs cause of action accrues for each of the violations at the time it occurs.
The plaintiff is thus required to bring suit within four years of the accrual date.
When the plaintiff is the victim of a "noncontinuing conspiracy," that is,
where the violations are of a permanent nature, he may take full advantage of
the four-year statutory period to ensure that the future alleged damages, or at
least a major portion of them, are ascertainable by the day of trial. The plaintiff
in a continuing conspiracy, however, may not enjoy the same luxury unless he
wishes to bring successive suits within four years of each violation. If the plain-
tiff does not follow this alternative, he will not be able to benefit from the four-
year statutory waiting period to the same extent for all the alleged violations.
The more recent the violation, the more likely that the future damages will be
speculative at the time of trial. Those damages which are not ascertainable at
the time of trial, regardless of the time of violation, will not be recoverable.
Attempting to solve this dilemma, the Court in Zenith decided that in a
continuing conspiracy, in which it is determined that future damages are too
speculative to recover at the time the action is brought, no cause of action will
accrue, and, therefore, no statutory limitation period will begin to run. The
Court concluded that the cause of action for these future damages "will accrue
only on the date they are suffered."37 From that date the plaintiff will have four
years within which to bring his action.
By "suffered" the Court meant the date on which the damages were no
longer speculative, that time when they become ascertainable, and not the ac-
tual date of damage. Injuries are "suffered" as of the date they can be
reasonably ascertained, as much as if the plaintiff were forced to wait until the
actual date of damage. 38 Given the Court's previous conclusion that the only
reason future damages would not be recoverable in the original action brought
within four years of the violation is that the damages were speculative, it
logically follows that the Court would permit their recovery when, and if, they
cease to be speculative. 39
When the Court applied its decision to the facts in Zenith it pointed out that
the determination of whether the future damages are speculative within four
years of the violation need not be determined in a court decision made within
that four-year period. According to the Court, it was necessary only to show
that had Zenith brought an action within the statutory period following the
violation, a court would have determined that the damages for which recovery
37 401 U.S. at 338.
38 This interpretation of "suffered" may be easily deduced from the Court's opinion even though no
specific definition is given by the Court itself.
39 Wheeler &Jones, supra note 16, at 76. This conclusion is also supported by looking at the contrasting
manner in which the Court uses the words "speculative" and "suffered." The Court sees these words as
opposites, stating that those damages which are not "too speculative" are considered to have been "already
suffered." 401 U.S. at 337. Thus, those damages which are "suffered" would be those which have ceased to
be speculative, and not necessarily those which have already materialized.
[Vol. 55:117] NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
is sought would then have been unascertainable. The Court concluded that
Zenith had met this test. Had Zenith brought the case within the statutory
period following the violation, the Court believed that those damages which oc-
curred from 1959 to 1963 would have been speculative. Thus, the Court held
that Zenith had brought its claim for the 1959-1963 damages within the
statutory period established under section 4(b).
The Court, therefore, refused to accept fully either the Steiner "date of
violation" approach, or the "date of damage" theory set out in Streiffer, and
followed by the Court in Hanover. Instead the Court created the "Zenith excep-
tion." Under this exception the plaintiff's cause of action is considered to ac-
crue on the date of violation, except in circumstances where it is determined that
certain damages which the plaintiff wishes to recover are either too speculative
at the time of trial, if an action is brought within four years of the violation, or
that they would have been speculative had an action been brought within that
four-year time period. When the exception is determined to apply, the date of
damage, defined as the date when the future damages are no longer
speculative, will determine when the cause of action will accrue.
IV. Beyond Zenith
In order to profit from the "Zenith exception," plaintiffs in private an-
titrust suits have contended that they are the victims of continuing con-
spiracies, a direct reversal of the pattern set after the Lawlor decision. 40 When
the courts find that a continuing conspiracy does exist, however, the plaintiffs
cannot be certain what the result will be. The uncertainty is due primarily to
the lower courts' failure to uniformly interpret and apply the "Zenith
exception." The lack of uniformity in turn results from the courts' failure to
follow the Zenith decision as it was written and as the Supreme Court meant for
it to be applied.
Two major interpretations of Zenith have evolved in the lower courts. The
first appeared shortly after the Zenith decision in the Second Circuit's ruling in
Ansul Company v. Uniroyal, Inc.41 One of the plaintiffs, Louisville Chemical
Company, alleged that it had been injured as a result of a "continuing... il-
legal market restraint" on the part of Uniroyal. The district court had held,
however, that the only violation Louisville could complain of was the initial ter-
mination of sales effected by Uniroyal in 1963. Since Louisville had not
brought suit until May 31, 1968, the lower court concluded that recovery was
barred under section 4(b). 42 The Second Circuit reversed this lower court deci-
sion, holding that Louisville had been the victim of a continuing conspiracy.
The court stated that, in Zenith, the Supreme Court had
held that a plaintiff in an antitrust action may recover damages occurring
within the statutory limitations period that are the result of conduct occurring
prior to that period if, at the time of the conduct, those damages were speculative,
uncertain, or otherwise incapable of proof.
43
40 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
41 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971).
42 Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 569 (S.D.N.Y 1969).
43 448 F.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
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The court thus permitted Louisville to recover damages for the period begin-
ning four years prior to the date suit was brought, May 31, 1964, because the
damages could not be proved with reasonable certainty at the time of the initial
violation in the conspiracy, sometime in late 1963. Recovery was therefore
allowed more than four and one-half years after the last violation complained of
by the plaintiff.
Interpretations similar to that of the Second Circuit have also been found
in the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits. In its decision in Continental-
Wirt Electron. Corp. v. Lancaster Glass Corp.,44 the Third Circuit initially viewed
the ruling in Zenith differently from the Second Circuit's treatment. When the
court went to apply Zenith to the facts, however, it did so in the same fashion as
the Second Circuit had in Ansul. The court initially stated that the reason
Zenith had been permitted to recover the future damages of which it com-
plained was because those damages had been too speculative during the time
that section 4(b) would have permitted it to sue, that is, within four years after
the violations. According to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court "rea-
soned that Zenith should be permitted to file its action when it could compute
its damages." 45 When the court applied Zenith to the facts of the case, however,
it instructed the district court on remand that should it find that some portion
of the plaintiffs damages were too speculative to be ascertainable at the time of
the overt act which produced them, those damages which became ascertainable
within the four-year period prior to the filing of the complaint would be
recoverable. 46 No mention was made of the need to determine that the
damages were unascertainable during the initial limitations period, within four
years of the alleged violation, as the court had originally stated would be the
case.
The Ninth Circuit's application of Zenith is found in Hanson v. Shell Oil
Co. 47 In the district court proceedings, the trial judge had instructed the jury
that in order for the plaintiff to recover it was necessary to find that the defen-
dant had committed overt acts in violation of the antitrust laws within four
years of the date suit was brought. The court of appeals found this instruction
to be erroneous, concluding that "Zenith stands for the proposition that a plain-
tiff may recover for acts violative of the antitrust laws committed prior to the
statute of limitations date, but that he may only recover those damages for such
acts which accrued and became ascertainable within the period of the
statute.' '48 Unlike the Second and Third Circuits, no direct reference was
made to the need to determine whether the damages were speculative at the
time of the alleged violation. This requirement, however, can be inferred from
the court's opinion. Although the court demanded the damage become "ascer-
tainable" during the statutory period preceding the suit, it noted no corre-
sponding requirement that there be an initial determination that the damage
would have been speculative had the suit been brought within four years of the
violation.
44 459 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1972).
45 Id. at 770.
46 Id.
47 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).
48 Id.
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Under this "ascertainment at violation" test expounded by the three cir-
cuits, the court would need only to determine that the damages in a continuing
conspiracy would have been speculative at the time of the violations com-
plained of by the plaintiff. As a result, a plaintiff may bring an action for those
damages within four years of any date when they cease to be speculative,
regardless of whether the court did or would have determined that those
damages were ascertainable within the initial four-year statutory period follow-
ing the violations. Thus, a plaintiff who was the victim of a continuing con-
spiracy in the years up to and through 1975 (whose damages from the 1975
violations were not ascertainable in 1975, but which ceased to be speculative in
1978) could bring suit until 1982 for those 1975 violations. It is clear that this
was not the intended result of the Court in Zenith nor does it follow the congres-
sional purpose underlying section 4(b).
49
In Zenith the Supreme Court stated that in those instances where a court
had or would have determined that damages were too speculative to recover
within four years of the conduct, then, and only then, would "the cause of ac-
tion for future damages . . . accrue . . . on the date that they are suffered.' '50
Where a court would not have found that the future damages were speculative
at a point four years after the alleged violation, there could be no right to bring
suit to recover at a date after the running of the initial statutory period. In the
previous example, the plaintiff in the continuing conspiracy lasting through
1975 could not bring suit for those violations any later than 1979 since the
damages resulting from those violations were ascertainable at a date (1978)
within the initial statutory period.
This example manifests the compromise inherent in the Zenith decision.
Although the Court did not wish to limit plaintiffs recovery when the damages
were genuinely speculative, it did wish to put a limit on his right to bring action
should those damages cease to be speculative within the initial statutory period.
The "ascertainment at time of violation" test is not only an improper
reading of Zenith, but is also inconsistent with the congressional intent behind
section 4(b). In creating section 4(b) Congress wished to place some limit on
the plaintiffs right of action, as there is some point in time when other con-
siderations outweigh the benefits of the private antitrust suit. 5' Two such con-
siderations were the burden of continuing antitrust actions on the administra-
tion of the courts and the burden on potential defendants.52 Under the "ascer-
tainment at time of violation" test, however, the burden on potential defen-
dants is increased significantly. By using this formula, potential defendants
may be subject to suit long after the end of the statutory period. Under the
"Zenith exception," however, as correctly applied, the burden on the defen-
dants in a continuing conspiracy is usually no greater than in a noncontinuing
conspiracy. Normally the cause of action will accrue at the time of violation,
with the statute of limitations barring suit four years after that date. Only when
the plaintiffs right of recovery outweighs the defendant's right to repose does
the "Zenith exception" extend the statutory limitation.
49 See text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.
50 401 U.S. at 337.
51 See text accompanying notes 4 and 5 supra.
52 Wheeler & Jones, supra note 16, at 78.
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In Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen53 the Fifth Circuit set out its own
unique interpretation of Zenith, one which completely ignores the Supreme
Court's opinion.5 4 According to the Fifth Circuit, before the plaintiff can sue
for future damages in a continuing conspiracy, he is required to prove that his
new claim for damages is based on a violation actually occurring during the
statute of limitations period preceding the date suit is brought.
In Poster Exchange, the court accepted the proposition that a plaintiff may
have continually accruing rights of action in a continuing conspiracy. Basing
its ruling on the Supreme Court's statement in Zenith that [g]enerally, a cause
of action accrues and the statute begins to run when the defendant commits an
act that injures a plaintiff's business," 5 5 the court concluded, however, that the
Supreme Court had ruled that it is still necessary for a newly accruing claim for
damages to be based on some injurious act actually occurring during the
limitations period. 56
No rational basis exists for this interpretation of Zenith, other than a failure
by the court to give Zenith a complete and impartial reading.5 7 The court ap-
parently took from Zenith only that which supported its conclusions. To require
that a new violation take place within the four-year period prior to suit and that
this violation cause the damages for which the plaintiff seeks recovery vitiates
the rationale underlying Zenith.58 The "Zenith exception" would be superfluous
under the Fifth Circuit's ruling since they are forcing the private complainant
to recover in the same manner as any other antitrust plaintiff, regardless of
whether he is the victim of a continuing conspiracy or a noncontinuing con-
spiracy. Precisely because the Supreme Court realized the difference between
plaintiffs in continuing conspiracies and noncontinuing conspiracies did it
create the "Zenith exception."
V. Policy Considerations-A Possible Solution
Although the Supreme Court in Zenith had attempted to decide the issue of
future damages in favor of the greatest justice for the plaintiff, it failed,
however, to contemplate the possible ramifications of its decision upon poten-
tial antitrust litigants.
Certainly, the Court's decision was in harmony with the objectives of sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, namely, that plaintiffs be adequately compensated
for antitrust violations, 59 as well as assuring that private antitrust actions re-
main "a bulwark of antitrust enforcement.' '60 By so deciding the case,
however, the Court made it more difficult for the plaintiff to recover future
damages in a single action, because courts would no longer need to be lenient
53 517 F.2d 117, 124 (5th Cir. 1971).
54 See generally Wheeler & Jones, supra note 16.
55 401 U.S. at 338.
56 517 F.2d at 128.
57 The Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of Poster Exchange more recently in Imperial Point Colon-
nades Condominium v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1977). It again emphasized that there must be
a new act committed within the limitation period and that that act must cause the complained of damage.
58 It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation follows the argument made by HRI in
Zenith, an argument which the Court clearly rejected.
59 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 139.
60 Id.
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in determining whether damages were speculative. 61 No longer would there be
the fear that should the court refuse to grant the plaintiff recovery in the present
action, the plaintiff would be denied the possibility of ever receiving adequate
compensation. Under Zenith the plaintiff would no longer be barred from
bringing a later suit to recover those speculative damages. The result requires,
of course, the plaintiff to bring several actions, perhaps many years into the
future, in order to complete his recovery.
62
The possible detrimental effect of Zenith on potential plaintiffs can be
shown by the following example. The victim of a continuing conspiracy in 1975
could obtain recovery in a suit brought in 1979 for damages he claims will oc-
cur from 1979 to 1990 by reason of the 1975 violations, if the court determines
that these damages are not speculative at the time of trial. Given the futurity of
the damages and the post-Zenith knowledge that should the court determine
that the damages are speculative, however, the plaintiff would not be barred
from bringing a later suit, the court may place a constraint on its previously
liberal attitude on what is considered speculative. Although it is true that Zenith
will permit the plaintiff to bring subsequent suits when the damages become
ascertainable, the court's new, more limited definition of what is speculative,
may force the plaintiff to bring suit in 1983 for the damages which have become
ascertainable from 1979 to 1983, then again in 1987 for the period 1983 to
1987, and so on. Although some of the damages would probably have been
speculative in 1979, as the court would determine, there would be no need to
restrict the definition of what is speculative solely because of the existence of the
"Zenith exception." Such a restriction would be especially harmful given the
possible ramifications of such a restrictive interpretation on potential plaintiffs,
not to mention its effect on judicial administration.
Future plaintiffs could also have been harmed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Zenith since it presents a new defense to plaintiff's actions. Defen-
dants can now argue that plaintiffs' suits based on once-speculative damages
are barred, contending that the damages had not in fact been so speculative as
to bar recovery in the original statutory limitations period.
Regardless of the possible effect on future plaintiffs, the ramifications of
Zenith for potential defendants is sure to be much greater. Zenith presents a real
possibility that defendants will be faced with costly and frequent defense of suc-
cessive antitrust suits, having to defend what would have once been considered
stale claims. For example, the continuing conspiracy victim who is the subject
of conspiratorial action in 1975 could recover any future damages which would
nof be provable by 1979 in subsequent proceedings. These subsequent actions
may be brought at almost any time in the future, regardless of how many years
have passed since the violation, with the only limitation being that the actions
be brought within four years of the date the damages become ascertainable.
Such an application of Zenith would frustrate the congressional purpose
underlying the enactment of section 4(b), no less than the misdirected inter-
pretations of the courts of appeals. This and other undesirable effects of the
61 See generally 38J. AIR L. & CoM. 67 (1972).
62 Id.
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various applications of Zenith may be obviated, however, while still retaining
the beneficial aspects of Zenith.
The first, and most obvious conclusion which can be drawn from this
discussion of Zenith and subsequent cases, is that for there to be a true solution
to any problem related to Zenith, a consistent and objective interpretation of the
decision is necessary. In applying Zenith the courts must:
1) Determine if the damages complained of are the result of a continuing anti-
trust violation (if not, the statute of limitations will run from the date of
violation);
2) Determine when the violations which gave rise to the damages took place,
remembering that under the "Lawlor rule" each successive day of the
continuing conspiracy is a new violation;
3) Determine if the damages complained of were speculative at the end of four
years subsequent to the date of violation, that is, at the latest date that suit
could be brought under the normal statutory scheme; if so,
4) Determine when the damages no longer were considered to be speculative,
i.e., when they became ascertainable;
5) Determine if the present action has been brought within four years of the
date damages became ascertainable.
The most desirable solution to the potential problems that may result from
Zenith, once it is uniformly applied, is for the courts to accept a standard for
determining when damages are speculative, a standard which is strict enough
to deny recovery when the damages are truly incapable of ascertainment, but
lenient enough to permit the greatest possible recovery in one proceeding. Such
a standard has already been created by the Supreme Court in Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.63 and Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc. 64 In those
decisions the Court held that damages are not speculative when and if the jury
can "make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant
data."165 In these circumstances the proof presented to the jury may be "prob-
able and inferential, as well as direct."
' 66
It follows from this definition of speculative damages that when presented
with a logical economic model which sets out with reasonable certainty what
the plaintiffs future damages will be, a judge or jury may reasonably conclude
that the damages are not speculative, and thus recoverable. In view of the ad-
vanced state of economics today, such a model could be created with relative
ease. One such model, "The Future Discounted Profits Model" was created in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zenith and attempted to render future
damages more provable and more susceptible of ascertainment.6 7 Although
63 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
64 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
65 Id. at 264.
66 Id. See generally Charlotte Telecasters v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1976).
67 Hoyt, Dahl, & Gibson, Comprehensive Modeisfor Assessing Lost Profits To Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L.
REV. 1233 (1976). This model postulates that the plaintiff who has lost his rightful share of a certain market
will be able to regain that share at the same rate as his original rate of entry, given that in both instances a
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this model might not be suited to all situations, it is a step in the right direction.
The development of such economic formulae will permit antitrust victims full
recovery in the fewest number of proceedings, while also protecting the defen-
dants from the possibility of the protracted or delayed pendency of antitrust ac-
tions.
VI. Conclusion
Plaintiffs wishing to recover future damages in private antitrust pro-
ceedings pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act, in particular those damages
that result from violations in a continuing conspiracy, have benefited from an
increasing flexibility of the courts to permit the greatest possible recovery in
one proceeding. Under the "Lawlor rule," as presently applied, plaintiffs are
limited as to the violations that they may complain of, but they are permitted to
recover damages that occur before and after trial which are the result of viola-
tions occurring before trial. The "Zenith exception" was created, in part, to
assure that those damages which were not recoverable as a result of the interac-
tion of the "Lawlor rule" and the statute of limitations (those future damages
which are still considered speculative within four years of the violation) would
still be recoverable at some later date, even though the normal statute of limita-
tions period would have run.
With the increasing flexibility in permitting recovery by antitrust plain-
tiffs, the courts have often ignored the plight of defendants who may be the sub-
ject of the increasing number of antitrust suits. Courts must, therefore, look at
the potential ramifications of this liberalized attitude on potential antitrust
defendants, as well as its effect on plaintiffs, with a view towards finding a
balance where the plaintiffs' rights do not outweigh the defendants' concurrent
rights. The median may be found if the courts correctly apply the "Zenith ex-
ception," and fully utilize the benefits of the science of economics to determine
when damages are to be considered speculative. By doing this, the courts will
ensure that plaintiffs receive their full measure of recovery, while defendants
are not overburdened by the weight of defending numerous, lengthy antitrust
suits.
Harry M. Bainbridge
free market existed. "Calculation of future profits is made by multiplying the lost market share times pro-
jected market sales and the plaintiff's projected profit rate. These values are in turn discounted on a yearly
basis to arrive at the present value of future damages." Id. at 1252. The three variables necessary in this
model are: (1) the time it will take the plaintiff to gain or regain its rightful share of the relevant market
following cessation of defendant's illegal practices (this growth rate can sometimes be determined by
reference to plaintiff's actual experience in originally entering the market, if prior to defendant's illegal con-
duct, or sometimes by using the yardstick approach, that is, by using a company similar to plaintiff's as a
basis for reference), (2) the plaintiff's rate of profit, determined by using plaintiff's historical profit in the
relevant market or related market or using the yardstick approach, again; and (3) the size of the future
market, determined by a mathematical model or expert testimony, or both. Id. at 1253-54.
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